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Mergers and Acquisitions: Team Performance
Richard Sperry, Antonie Jetter
Dept. of Engineering and Technology Management, Portland State University, USA
Abstract-Many mergers and acquisitions in high
technology do not yield the expected results and acquired
technologies fail to create value as planned. One explanation is
the difficulty to transfer and integrate the tacit components of
technological knowledge, when work groups and teams are
disrupted. Mergers force work group and team members to
redefine their roles, change their working approaches, and
develop a shared vision and culture. The paper therefore
researches high-tech mergers from a team perspective through
an exploratory case study of two formerly separate Quality
Assurance groups that were integrated into one. The case study
identifies three factors that impact team performance after a
merger: strong vision, clear communication, and operational
synergy built on an open team culture and a common working
approach
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological innovations are the key to business success
in high-tech industries. Corporations do not only create them
internally, but also use outside sources and "buy" innovation
though licensing, R&D contracting and consulting, hiring
away of key personnel or by taking over or merging with
other companies. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) play a
major part in the business world. In 2006, over 3.8 trillion
dollars were announced in transactions in the United States
alone [15]. For major corporations, M&A are not single
events, but integral part of their business strategies. Since
2000, for example, Microsoft has acquired over 37
companies, EMC has acquired 17 companies, Google has
acquired 25 companies, and Yahoo has acquired 27
companies. [3].
M&A yields control over the existing assets (patents,
product lines, and buildings) of the acquired company as well
as the future value created through the capabilities
(employees and their intellectual property) of the acquired
company [7].
Studies indicate that somewhere between 50% and 80%
of M&A fail [22]. While some of these failures can be
attributed to a misjudgment of the value of the acquired
technologies [17], others are caused by the inability to fully
exploit the intellectual property of the employees in the
acquired companies, as teams are disrupted and team roles
have to be redefined. Accordingly, Schweiger and Weber
state synergy is a factor that contributes to the success or
failure of a merger [21]. They also indicate people are
affected by M&A and there is often trauma and performance
implications for both companies, as the integration of
workforces means change that affects employee moral,
especially when layoffs, turnover, and loss of key personnel
are at stake. The acquiring company must therefore properly
plan for change while sustaining value it acquired. Transition
teams are essential in the integration [14], however they do
not suffice, especially since change often appears successful
at first, but after time it fails [10]. Larrson and Lubatkin
indicate that in the long-term, fundamental change is
necessary for M&As to be successful and they state
"Acculturation in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is the
outcome of a cooperative process whereby the beliefs,
assumptions, and values of two previously independent work
forces form a jointly determined culture" [13]. They further
state "achieving acculturation represents a major post-
acquisition challenge to acquiring firms."
This case study researches operational synergy between
two independent work forces working together through the
melding of cultures with two high technology companies.
Specific emphasis is on the Quality Assurance (QA)
organization because it was the first functional organization
to merge work forces. The merger exceeded financial
expectations of market share but failed in meeting the
operational and budgetary objectives. The findings from this
exploratory research support the notion of acculturation and
synergy as important factors of the success of M&A. The
paper presents these findings with specific focus on work
team performance. In addition to the introduction (Part I), it
is structured in four parts: In part II, the characteristics and
attributes of work group and team performance are defined.
Part III describes the case study methodology for data
collection and summarizes the observations in the QA
organization. Part IV analyzes the findings and compares
them to current supporting research. Part V discusses the
findings and gives recommendations for areas for further
empirical research.
II. TEAMS
In this case study, the members of the work force
participate on project teams that produce new technology
products or upgrades to the existing product line.
Understanding what disciplines or characteristics that creates
operational synergy was necessary for this research.
Katzenbach and Smith identified basic disciplines that
determine team performance. They indicate team
performance depends on having a common purpose, common
set of performance goals, a commonly agreed upon working
approach, and they must hold one another mutually
accountable [9].
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In their research, they have characterized and identified
various levels of performance, as shown in Figure 1 - Team
Performance Curve, as adapted from [9 p84]. The higher the
team performance the higher level of synergy is found among
the team members. A work group, which is a very common
structure in large organizations as project teams are formed
with members from multiple matrix functional organizations.
The primary characteristic that sets the work group apart
from a real team or high performance team is that the work
group's focus is on individual deliverables or contributions,
where as a real team or high-performance team has a
common purpose, performance goal, and working approach,
and a team members are accountable to one another.
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Figure 1 - Team Performance Curve
Katzenbach and Smith have broken down teams into
pseudo, potential, real, and high performance. A pseudo team
is the worst performer of all. A pseudo team is a
dysfunctional group of individuals who have called
themselves a team with no common purpose or performance
goals. A potential team, on the other hand, tries to achieve
performance goals. However, it is weak in developing a
common working approach and it has not established a sense
of accountability to each of the team members. A real team
has established common working approach and is
accountable to each member on the team, in addition to
having a common purpose and performance goals. A high
performance team goes one step further in that they deeply
committed the personal growth and success of the each other.
III. CASE STUDY
A. Methodology
The methodology consisted of researching and designing
an interview guide with questions that would probe team and
group performance. The information from the interviews
was recorded for consistency and populated in a spreadsheet
for data analysis.
1) Research Questions and Design
The purpose of this research was the exploration of the
impact of mergers on work groups and teams. Questions of
interest included, but were not limited to the following: How
do work groups and teams experience the change associated
with a merger? How do the defining characteristics of a team
described in the previous section evolve over time? How do
the merger and the subsequent changes affect employee's
ability to function effectively as a team and create value? Do
high-tech companies, on the team level, actively manage the
process of acculturation after a merger?
For the exploratory first step of this research, a total of
three case study companies were selected based on the
following criteria (1) high technology product that requires
expert knowledge, (2) merger aims at the integration and
further growth of value assets from both companies, (3) some
experience with M&A as a strategic choice. Criteria 2 and 3
were chosen to exclude M&A activities that are planned to
result in the discontinuation of one company's value assets
and mergers that are "one-time-events," with no established
management practices.
Open-ended interviews were conducted in all three case
study companies, capturing different team-members
perspectives on the merger. An interview guide was created
to ensure consistent and structured data gathering process for
all interviewees. The interview portfolio was structured into
five areas of research: Purpose and Goals; Working
Approach; Accountability; Commitment to Growth and
Success, and External Impacts. External impacts looked at
culture, policies, and retention of individuals. Each of these
areas was chosen because they probe and ascertain specifics
characteristics on organization team performance as well as
task and human integration and its impact on the operational
synergy [4].
The case study will be further discussed in the following
sections. To protect the privacy of the company, the names of
the case study company and the people involved have been
altered; however, the pertinent information remains true and
all explanations of events and outcomes is factual.
2) Data Collection
The case study company, FINCorp, is a leading fortune
company 500 listed on the NYSE. The company provides
financial data processing services to more than 16,000 clients
worldwide, including banks, credit unions, financial
planners/investment advisers, insurance companies and
agents, self-insured employers, lenders, and savings
institutions with over $3.4 billion in processing and services
revenues. FINCorp has 87 business units, which operate as
separate businesses. Many of these businesses were the result
of mergers and acquisitions.
FINTran, a business unit of FINCorp, is one of the fastest-
growing financial data processing businesses within
FINCorp. In January of 2003, FINTran announced the
acquisition of Financial Data Services (FDS), who is a
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competitor in same market. FINTran's revenue in 2003 was
over $68 million and FDS was over $140 in revenue. A
summary is provided in TABLE 1: A DESCRIPTION OF THE
CASE STUDY. In addition to processing financial transaction
product line, FDS also operated a network that connected
acquirers and issuers of these financial transactions. The
business objective for the acquisition thus was market share
and growth. At the time of acquisition, both organizations
had between 1,300 and 1,400 clients each. However, it was
the TranX network that was growing rapidly and presented a
new customer base to FINTran to fill the void in a mature
market place.
Unlike acquisitions where the acquiring organization
swallows up a smaller organization, it was the opposite in
this case: FINTran serviced their clients with 235 employees,
while FDS had 647, at the time of the acquisition. FINCorp
chose not let FDS run as one of its 87 separate business unit,
but rather chose to absorb FDS into FINTran. The integration
of the two companies resulted in an executive management
team with key executive management personnel from both
companies. The FINTran CEO remained as CEO, while the
CEO of FDS became the COO. Strategic planning, financial
reporting, and budgetary requirements were conducted under
the umbrella of the FINCorp.
Revenue &O6 million $ 14U million
Client Base 1300-1400 1300-1400
Employees 235 647
PCI: Transaction NOAC:
Product Line Processing Transaction
Services Services
TranX: The
Network
EVP HR QA
Manager 2 QA AnalystsInterviews 2 QA Analysts 3rd Party Observer
3rd Party Observer
The merger has met and partially exceeded management's
business objective by turning FINTran into a market leader
with operations expanding world wide with revenues
exceeding $230 million in 2006. It did, however, not meet the
financial operational and budgetary objectives and timelines
to merge and integrate workforces. After 3 years it is was still
riddled with organizational issues that were particularly
evident in the Quality Assurance (QA) department, which
was the focus of the case study. The QA department was
chosen because it was the first functional organization that
attempted to merge operations from both companies into a
single organization. The interviews consisted of eight
individuals. One of the interviewee's was the QA manager.
The QA manager was an employee of FINTran, the acquiring
company, and was responsible for merging both QA
departments into one organization. Two interviewees' were
QA analysts from FDS, the acquired company. Another two
interviewees' were QA analysts who were employees of
FINTran the acquiring company. Two additional
interviewees' were outside consultants who acted as third-
party observers, as they had no allegiance to either
organization. The last interviewee was with the Executive
Vice President (EVP) of Human Resources who was heavily
involved defining the integration process and employee
polices, which included benefits and layoffs. In addition, the
EVP was a member of the integration team.
Several of the interviewees had been involved with other
mergers and acquisitions which provided additional insight
into the findings. Of particular interest was one interviewee,
currently working at FINTran, who actually work for FDS
when their company was acquired by FDS, but left due to the
integration issues.
Each interview took approximately 1 to 2 hours in length
with additional follow-up questions and observations on
work processes themselves. The raw interview information
was captured on a voice recording machine and placed into a
spreadsheet. The voice recorder allowed playback of the
interview to accurately reflect the interviewees' comments.
The spreadsheet facilitated data analysis by sorting and
dissection of acts or events.
B. Description ofFindings
The data analysis was broken down by those disciplines
that differentiated the level of performance and synergy of
team performance as identified by Katzenbach and Smith.
The results of the findings are presented in the following sub-
sections.
1) Common Purpose and Goals
The executive team was a combination of both FINTran
and FDS key management personnel. The dynamics between
the CEO and COO in combination with separate product
lines created a mixed environment. It was unclear as to who
was in control, FINTran or FDS. In fact, the employees
referred to each side of the organization in terms of the
transaction processing product line, PCI (FINTran) and
NOAC (FDS). This created a division, or in some cases a
civil war amongst employees.
In the initial 2 years, the FINTran and FDS QA
organizations were managed separately. The reason given
was because the skills were different to support the PCI and
NOAC product lines and this contributed to them not
understanding the company's vision. They attributed this to
both products were being offered and sold by separately. As
a result, they were unsure about the company's purpose and
goals. One of the interviewees mentioned that in the initial
stages of the integration process the executive management
indicated the NOAC is the product line of choice; however,
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both product lines remain today with no clear vision for the
future. This has led to more questions and uncertainty.
Everyone knew integration between the products was no
small task. Additionally, the company was focused on adding
new products to compete in the market space. These new
products were duplicated on both product lines; thereby
increasing the cost of ownership. The lack of product vision
continues to fuel the "us" vs. "them."
Both QA organizations indicated at the functional
organizational level, their purpose and goals were understood
as they remained the same; being committed to assuring the
code base is defect free. Each organization conducted their
QA testing independently with no overlap. This was
primarily due the different skills sets and knowledge required
for testing. FINTran's PCI product line is comprised of third-
party vendor software with minimal customization, where as
the FDS NOAC product line is heavily custom software.
In the summer of 2005, the COO left the organization to
run another business unit in FINCorp. Within weeks of the
announcement major changes were made at the executive
management level as well their direct reports. This sent a
clear message to all employees that FINTran was one
company and will be led by one CEO. As result, both QA
organizations were merged under leadership of the FINTran's
QA manager. The manager reaffirmed that the merged QA
organization still had one common goal, which was defect-
free code. This was reassuring to all. It was also
communicated to both QA organizations that no changes
would be made right away. The manager visited all QA
employees at their location to listen and gain insight into the
issues still at hand, and learn more about the operations and
working approach.
2) Common WorkingApproach
Before and during initial years of the acquisition, both QA
organizations had completely different approaches to testing.
The FINTran organization conducted their testing in a semi-
structured environment. They were handed code from
research and development (R&D) ready to test. They used
the high-level design that was created by R&D to create test
scripts. Once testing was completed, they handed the code
back to R&D, who was then responsible for managing the
installation in cooperation with the data center and network
operations.
On the other hand, FDS had a very structured formal
project management process based on CMM best practices.
Their approach to testing included formal test plans and test
scripts, which were based on approved business
requirements, business design (user interface and report
layouts), and technical design specifications. The process
also required design specifications and requirements to be
approved by Sales, Development, QA, Operations, and
Implementation at each step in the project lifecycle.
In the last quarter of 2004, the more formal FDS project
management processes were introduced throughout the
enterprise. This signaled that FDS has won the battle and led
to resistance of the working approach as well as uncertainty
within the FINTran organization. Although the FINTran
recognized the need for these more formal processes, the
FINTran analysts commented the process and documentation
was overwhelming for them. One such comment was "it
takes 4 hours to document a 5 minute task."
The formal project management process required QA
analysts be active members in the development project, from
requirements definition through installation, and provide
support in diagnosing production issues. This resulted in the
FINTran QA analysts becoming more involved in each step
of the project and even began to manage the release into
production; thereby extending their responsibility and
authority.
In the first quarter of 2005, management approved an
initiative that required the integration between the PCI and
NOAC product lines, thereby forcing a "limited" cooperation
among both QA groups. For the most part, product line
testing still remains as separate activities and the issue of
control still exist.
By 2006, the growth of the company has resulted in
approximately 600 new clients, with 105 active projects with
aggressive client commitments, and another 90+ projects to
be started. Both sides now believe areas of the project
management process is breaking down as QA is seeing
contention for the same code base, thereby creating
dependencies among projects and creating delays to acquire
the code base to test.
3) Mutual Accountability and Commitment to Success
Despite the "us vs. them" mentality that exists, the QA
analysts are committed to their profession so the acquisition
did not change that commitment or their accountability to
each other. Their professional motivation was to ensure
defect-free code. The two organizations just had different
approaches and methods. The FINTran organization always
performed integration and system testing before releasing
code to production. This forced accountability among the
FINTran QA analysts to ensure defect-free code and that one
component did not affect another. On the other hand, the
NOAC product line was heavily customized with many
components. FDS QA Analysts had specific component
knowledge and their testing tasks were aligned by system
component. It was typical on the NOAC product line to move
individual components into production at different times.
As mentioned above, the cross-product line project
required the PCI QA environment to include NOAC platform
functionality. In the beginning, it was made perfectly clear
that the building of the NOAC functionality in PCI QA
environment would be done by a FDS QA analyst to ensure
the NOAC functionality was properly built. This decision
signaled a lack of trust and commitment amongst the
FINTran QA analysts. Due to time constraints, a FINTran
QA analyst had to build the environment with consultative
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support from the FDS QA analyst. At the completion, the
FINTran and FDS QA analysts saw this as a galvanizing
event that broke down a wall between the two organizations
and set the tone for joint commitment to success and
accountability in getting the job done without organizational
ties.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
The analysis of the case described above shows three
reoccurring themes that seemed to have played a role for the
productivity of a merged project team: the lack of a strong
vision, deficiencies in communication, and the absence of
operational synergy. They will be further discussed in the
following sections.
A. Vision
Kotter indicates a clear vision is required any time
changes are made in a team, especially during integration
after a company acquisition [10]. Kotter identifies that a
vision has three primary outcomes:
1) Sets the direction for change
2) Motivates people to help them overcome resistance
3) Coordinates the actions of the individuals.
Kotter also emphasizes creating a vision requires
participation from the managers who have a stake in the new
team. Once the vision is defined, those managers must be
role-models of that vision for the rest of the team.
It was observed the new executive management team did
not take the time to create a clear vision. As mentioned,
management hinted that NOAC was the product line of
choice, but clearly this was not the case as the two products
continue to exist in the same market space. Skipping the
vision setting, results in organizations that are not motivated
toward any direction and are therefore in constant conflict
[10]. In addition, the lack of a clear vision fostered
uncertainty as to who was in control: The FINTran
employees believed they were in control since they acquired
FDS. On the other hand FDS thought they were in control
because the FDS project management process was being
implemented enterprise wide, in addition to rumor that
NOAC was the product of choice. This ended up with a lack
of manger buy-in and ultimately an unsuccessful integration
that created an "us" vs. "them" attitude.
When the shared vision is finally defined and
communicated, each person committed to fulfilling that
vision will be able to picture what life will be like when the
vision is complete [10]: Having a common vision that
everyone understands and works toward reduces unnecessary
work, duplication of effort, and conflict amongst the team
members from the acquired and acquiring companies.
B. Communication
Organizational communication to employees is possibly
one of the most important and yet commonly overlooked
instrument for engendering identification [20]. Stakeholder
communication is important in every type of project as it
builds a strong team and often delays in project and even
failures can be attributed to poor communication [1]. When
communication is strong there is no confusion - goals are
known and clear [10]. The type of communication varies
depending on the phase of integration between two
companies - pre-merger or planning, initial integration, or
full-swing post-integration as employees needs change due to
uncertainty and insecurity [8]. Communication becomes more
critical during the integration as employees experience the
affects of the M&A; therefore, it is important to continually
communicate the value of the M&A and how the employees
will fit into the organization [19].
Although, this case study did not directly deal with the
pre-merger announcement, literature suggests when an
organization first learns of the merger or acquisition the
employees natural reaction is ask how this will impact them.
The main goal of communication is to diminish uncertainty
as found Schweiger's and Denisi's study of two plants
(controlled and experimental) [18]. In their study they
observed there is a negative impact due to uncertainty.
Specifically, as uncertainty increases so does stress. In
addition, satisfaction decreases along with the interaction and
commitment to remain with the organization. They further
indicate that realistic communication in the form of the
merger preview in the planning stage helps employees
through this process.
Therefore, it is better to be upfront than to not say
anything. Messmer indicates, "even if you don't have all the
facts yet, discuss all of what you are allowed to reveal,
including issues that are under consideration and the timeline
for decisions [ 16]." Messmer also states "Early
communication is critical in any merger or acquisition
situation. If employees receive the initial word of change
without immediate follow-up information, the rumor mill will
undoubtedly start turning." He goes on and further
recommends getting your staff involved by soliciting their
feedback and ideas. The manager should communicate as
openly as possible to maintain the team trust and to
encourage the team to communicate openly with him or her.
If the manager is too secretive, then the team is left to make
his or her own assumptions, which are generally more
pessimistic than reality [2] [5].
Once the integration phase begins, this period of
transition is critical to maintain communication for building a
strong organization. It should be very clear who is in control.
Just as the FINTran case shows, when people were unclear
who was in charge they tend to retreat to their comfort zones
and rely on old procedures [2]. Immediately following the
acquisition, higher-level management and the direct manager
needs to reinforce and communicate the value of the M&A
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and its impact on both the acquired and acquiring employees.
As Messmer indicated, the manager does not need to have an
integration plan. To minimize impact and feel value, people
need to continue doing what they were doing prior to the
acquisition until the new strategy is developed. By soliciting
feedback and making people feel have a purpose the manager
can help to restore their sense of worth and maintain their
productivity [15] [19].
There is no prescribed set time for how long the
integration will take. It does vary by the type of innovation or
value expected from the project team [7]. For full integration
of radical innovation, the period will take longer than if only
partial integration and incremental innovation are expected
[7]. Initial integration needs to allow for sufficient analysis
and understanding but should not drag on unnecessarily.
During this time, project team members are waiting to see
how they will fit into the new team. This is where a manager
with clear and strong leadership must be present. During this
time, no major changes will occur, but extensive time will be
spent in a period of analysis. The manager should be building
communication channels, which should start from the very
beginning and be ongoing [ 1]. Established clear and
effective channels of communication will aid the manager in
understanding the core competencies of each team and the
individual strengths and weaknesses of project team
members, as well as hearing and addressing their needs and
concerns [11].
As in the case of with the two QA organizations, the
FINTran QA manager decided to listen before making any
decisions and restated the existing QA purpose and goals. It
was also observed, waiting too long can lead to a feeling of
alienation in the project teams and also encourage an "us-vs.-
them" attitude. Once these team divisions start to strengthen,
the barriers can be very difficult to break down.
The initial integration phase should complete with a
strong enough understanding of the big picture and the
details that the manager can develop a strategy for merging
the projects and building an effective team. Once sufficient
analysis and understanding is taken, it is time to move toward
full integration and the building of cooperative processes that
minimizes weaknesses while leveraging strengths. The
strategy must support the goals and objectives as defined by
the vision of the larger organization, and those financial and
value creation goals that were intended to be attained through
the acquisition. Clearly, the lack of vision by FINTran made
this difficult.
According to Jemison and Haspeslagh, communication
challenges to be addressed throughout integration include the
following points [7]:
1. Establishing interface management
2. Putting operations on an even keel
3. Instilling a new sense of purpose
4. Taking stock and establishing control.
5. Strengthening the acquired organization
6. Developing mutual understanding
7. Building credibility up and down.
C. Operational Synergy
Operational synergy is based on organizations' culture
and common working approach.
1) Culture
Acculturation requires two companies coming together
and creating cooperative processes-based beliefs,
assumptions, and values [13]. Larson and Lubatkin point out
that although it may be popular to blame M&A failures on
cultural difference, their studies have found acculturation
depends on the "social controls" or the amount of
coordination efforts expanded by the buying firm. Two
companies don't simply clash because of their cultural
differences. It is when the acquiring company imposes formal
integrating controls on its acquired firm's culture that it is
less likely acculturation will be achieved. Conversely, the
more informal social controls or shared experiences used, the
more likely acculturation is achieved. They also found
removing autonomy is not always an impediment to
achieving acculturation as long as it is coupled with a high
level of informal control and it was non-authoritarian.
Birkinshaw et al found long-term success is achieved through
process management, communication, and sensitivity to the
concerns and expectations of the employees on both sides of
the M&A [4]. Therefore, informal social controls, such as
such as training programs, site visits, and celebration or
socialization rituals are needed to support process
management, communication, and concerns and expectations
of the joint work forces.
It is interesting to note, from the outset FINCorp decided
to integrate the two companies and that key FDS executives
would join the FINTran executive management team.
Because FDS was not left to be it is own business unit and
there was the formation ofjoint executive management team,
FINCorp was signaling to FDS it had to maintain and comply
with the FINTran strategic planning, financial reporting, and
budgetary requirements. This implied a level of restriction to
FDS or removal of autonomy [13]. In 2005, when the COO
left, the changes in management in combination with merging
the organizations, FINTran further signaled to FDS that
autonomy was not longer tolerated and FINTran management
was in charge.
Synergy between the work forces is required to ensure a
successful working relationship and environment. The "us-
vs.-them" attitude suggested a clash between FINTran and
FDS cultures. However, despite this tension and "us-vs.-
them" attitude, FINTran did achieve its objective of market
and growth. This may be part in due to FINTran and FDS
being in the same industry. Trompenaars and Prud'Homme
state there are four types of organizational culture:
competitive, formal, individualistic, and democratic [21]. All
companies have a culture dominant in one of these areas with
small elements of the others. The change in two merging
cultures happens gradually over time and cannot be forced.
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This also suggests that at the lower levels, such as QA
analysts, they were able to get past the tension and jointly
unify forces to create joint or mutual accountability using
informal social controls, thereby supporting Larson and
Lubatkin concept of informal social controls. The level of
success from the galvanizing event with the building of the
NOAC components within the PCI environment, signaled a
real team can come together when there is mutual
accountability [9] [13].
2) Working Approach
The working approach is one of interest. An effective
team is one that understands and has developed a common
approach to working with one another to accomplish their
vision [9]. In the initial years, the two QA organizations were
left to operate autonomously in physically remote locations.
Skill-based strategic capabilities are often difficult to transfer
primarily due to the knowledge, procedures, and culture that
are imbedded within the team [6] [7]. Haspeslagh and
Jemison further indicate the more complex the capabilities
are, the longer it will take for the acquiring individual or
team to learn those skills, as was proved true in FINTran case
study. This decision to keep the two QA groups autonomous
and maintain a decentralized environment as not loose
knowledgeable resources resulted in operational synergies,
which was never achieved.
At the end of 2005, FINTran QA had to adopt the FDS
project management processes. The project management
processes instilled formal and structured social controls.
Although the FINTran QA determined a need for a more
structured approach, there was not a sense of commitment to
this new approach and as a result, productivity decreased.
Reasoning suggests that moving to a single set of processes
without a clear understanding of how it supports the
organization's purpose and performance goals led to
confusion and tension within the FINTran QA organization.
As indicated previously, Larsson and Lubatkin contend that
formal hierarchical controls threaten the social controls and
that coordination efforts require social controls that are non-
authoritarian and informal, and show characteristics of strong
cooperation, informal communication and teamwork [13].
Productivity is gained when the information is shared
when helping each member cross areas of responsibility. This
is a common characteristic of mutual accountability and a
real team working together [9]. The informal social controls
presented by the QA analysts worked effectively to break
down walls, as signified by the galvanizing event in the
building the NOAC functionality within the PCI QA
environment. It also signaled that employee or team member
empowerment will eliminate barriers [10]. As a result,
operational synergy was created between the two
organizations.
Jemison and Haspeslagh have outlined the following
considerations that should be taken before integrating teams,
which have been executing with separate working
approaches include [7]:
1. When value creation is deemed a strategic objective to
be been gained from an organization's culture it is best
to understand the culture and its capabilities first, before
the transformation to the other culture. This applies to
both organizations transferred to another culture. First
each firm must learn about the other, and then all must
learn about the capability to be transferred.
2. Enabling the willingness of people on both sides to work
together. This requires eliminating the feeling that job
security, and control over resources and direction is lost
when one side or the other feels they have "won" the
battle.
3. It is necessary to identify and not assume the capabilities
of the acquired organization before the transformation.
4. A clear alignment of project (team) goals to corporate
goals is necessary to give a clear understanding of how
they impact the overall strategy. By understanding their
purpose and goal, the expected results from their tasks is
understood as well as its importance.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
FINTran was successful in achieving its business
objective of market share and growth, but failed in meeting
its financial operational and budgetary objectives for
integrating work forces. It stands to reason that FINTran's
market share and growth increased by having two product
lines and a combined customer base. Conversely, the cost of
ownership of maintaining staff to support two product lines
in the same market space exceeds the costs and ownership of
one integrated product line. Furthermore financial,
operational and budgetary integration was not achieved as
fast and as completely as planned. This case study offered
insight into the integration process and its problem areas:
Alhough FINTran's CEO was in charge and the former
FDS executives had to share responsibilities with other
FINTran executives as an attempt to remove autonomy, it
was not clear. Maintaining and selling of two product lines
fostered two separate organizations with different skills sets
at different locations. This made it very difficult to remove
autonomy from the formerly independent FDS. Poor
communication and lack of a clear vision by executive
management led to confusion as did the lack of a common
purpose, thereby fostering an "us-vs.-them" attitude. When
the COO left, who originated from FDS, the current
management team sent a clear signal that integration was a
mandate and FDS's autonomy will be removed.
The division of skills and product lines furthermore did
nothing to instill a common working approach. When a
common project management process was implemented, it
was filled with formal controls that were met with resistance.
The QA manager took the time and effort to listen, analyze,
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and build communication channels, while reassuring
department purpose and goals; however, little was done to
build operational synergy between work forces. Although the
lack of a vision made it difficult, operational synergy could
have been accomplished by bridging of skills and knowledge
across the two product lines. This is evident by the limited
project that not only bridged skills and knowledge, but it also
created mutual accountability and commitment to success as
result of combined product effort.
This case study identified several barriers 1) lack of a
clear vision and understanding of purpose 2) separation of
skills and ownership, and 3) no common working approach
that was understood. The current body of research on
communication, vision setting, and performance goals is
quite extensive, but leaves questions unanswered. How can
two merged organization create and communicate a clear
vision when all pieces of the M&A may not be understood at
the time of integration? In addition, what levels of social
controls are needed for integration of workforces and cultures
and at what level of autonomy is required? While these
problem areas are explored in this paper, the answers
provided are limited in scope. With further empirical research
into these questions and issues, the functional manager or
team leader will have a greater understanding and
implementing operational strategies and will not be
powerless; as all of these factors can be managed throughout
the acquisition process.
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